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CPE DIRECT
INVESTOR VIEWS OF
AUDIT ASSURANCE:
RECENT EVIDENCE OF
THE EXPECTATION GAP
What do investors expect from an audit?
by Marc J. Epstein and Marshall A. Geiger
nvestors and financial statement users long
have agi'eed on the usefulness of the audit
in financial reporting. Over time, however,
auditors have been expected to provide as-
surance in varying degi-ees and for differ-
ent purposes. Differences in perception—
especially regarding assurances provid-
ed—between users, preparers and auditors
have been termed the "expectation gap."
This article provides some startling evi-
dence of the existence of such a gap in in-
vestor perceptions of the assurance provid-
ed by an audit.
EVOLUTION OF THE AUDIT
In the early years of the U.S. auditing pro-
fession—from 1850 to the early 1900s—au-
ditors primarily were engaged to provide
almost absolute assurance against fraud
and intentional mismanagement. As corpo-
rate America gi'ew and the auditing pro-
fession developed, the early 1900s saw a
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shift away from verifying all transactions
and amounts for purposes of fraud detec-
tion to determining fairness in financial
statement reporting. This shift partly was
a response to the burgeoning volume of
business activity (making fraud detection
less feasible) and the appearance and in-
creased imi)ortance of a new business play-
er—the shareholder. Corporate sharehold-
ers and other outside parties became in-
creasingly reliant on auditors to attest to
management-provided information, neces-
sitating a shift in the primary audit objec-
tive to providing assurance on externally
reported financial information.
Current practice has not strayed far
from that of early corporate America, with
the primary audit focus on financial state-
ment reasonableness. Current standards
still reflect the matenal misstatement fo-
cus and increasingly have relied on the con-
cept of "reasonable assurance" in de})icting
the level of reliance to be placed on audited
information. One need only skim current
auditing standards to find pervasive evi-
dence of the reasonable assurance con-
cept's use as the foundation for reliance on
audited financial statements. Statement on
Auditing Standards no. BI, Evidential
Matter, SAS no. 39, Audit Sampling, and
SAS no. 53, The Auditor's Respoiisibilitif
to Detect and Report Errors and Irregu-
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larities, all I'ely on the concept of reason-
able assurance.
Regardless of professional standards,
however, an important question for the
profession is, What assurance does the
public currently expect auditors to pro-
vide? As a profession, CPAs continually
must assess public reaction to their stated
role in financial reporting as well as deter-
mine the public's perception of the type
and level of assurances believed or desired
to be provided by auditors.
THE ASSURANCE PROBLEM
The expectation gap has plagued the public
accounting profession almost from incep-
tion. Yet the profession has tried to mini-
mize the disparity. From 1945 to 1950, the
American Institute of Accountants (an
American Institute of CPAs predecessor)
undertook an active campaign to enlighten
the public to the public accountant's "true"
responsibility. Around this time, the pro-
fession began to clarify communications to
the public regarding its self-pei'ceived re-
sponsibility. Specifically, the standard au-
ditor's report was modified in 1948 to com-
municate better to the public what an audit
was and to present the auditor's opinion
more clearly. In 1950, over 70,000 co])ies of
a pamphlet describing an audit, audit re-
ports and auditor responsibilities were dis-
tributed to banks and other groups inter-
ested or involved in financial reporting.
These early efforts were the profes-
sion's attempts to hring public perception
in line with the profession's notion of its
role. Recent efforts have focused on both
public opinion and changing professional
standards to bridge the gap.
THE NEW SASs
A battery of expectation gap SASs were is-
sued in 1988 partly to address public criti-
cism of the auditing profession and partly
to provide increased levels of service to au-
dit clients and the public. Although several
of the SASs depict auditor responsibility in
terms of the reasonable assui-ance concept,
two are especially germane. SAS no. 58,
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EXPECTATION GAP
Reports on Audited Fmancial Statements,
requires a new standard audit report in-
cluding an explicit statement that an audit
provides reasonable assurance for reliance
on the fairness of the financial statements.
SAS no. 53 increases the auditor's respon-
sibility to design an audit to provide rea-
sonable assurance that material errors and
irregularities will be detected.
The statement added to the new audit
report is a culmination of almost 20 years
of effort to establish reasonable assurance
as a basis for the standard report. In 1972,
the AICPA committee on auditing proce-
dure proposed a modified audit report to
address what its members believed were
differences in intended and perceived au-
dit report messages. The proposed report
included the notions of materiality, test-
ing and reasonable assurance, but it even-
tually was withdrawn due to anticipated
negative public reaction. Several intermit-
tent attempts to alter the standard audit
report also tried to include reasonable as-
surance in a new report. SAS no. 58 em-
bodies the intent of these early proposals
with an explicit reference that communi-
cates to readers that an audit provides
reasonable assurance of financial state-
ments' material accuracy.
While SAS no. 58 communicates more
explicitly the level of assurance an audit is
intended to provide, SAS no. 53 says audi-
tors have a responsibility to design audits
to provide reasonable assurance that all
material misstatements will be detected.
Former standards had required auditors to
plan an audit to search for material errors
and irregularities. Together, these SASs
I'einforce both internally and externally the
concept of reasonable assurance and the in-
tention that an audit provide such a level of
assurance to users.
SHAREHOLDER VIEWS
We recently conducted a national survey
of investors to gather information on their
views of various aspects of financial re-
porting issues. F^articipants were selected
if they owned 100 or more shares of a
stock listed on the American or New York
stock exchanges. In total 24() responses
were obtained, representing individuals
from all 50 states.
Two separate questions asked investors
what level of assurance they believed audi-
tors should provide for detecting material
misstatements as a result of error (unin-
tentional misstatements) and as a result of
fraud (intentional misstatements). The an-
ticipated typical response was reasonable
assurance. However, investors held audi-
tors to a much higher level of assurance.
The exhibit on page 64 gives the results of
both questions.
For material misstatement due to er-
I'ors, only about 51% of the investors be-
lieved they should receive reasonable as-
surance. Approximately 47% wanted ab-
solute assurance financial statements are
free of material misstatements due to er-
rors. This unexpected result clearly is in
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• FOR MANY YEARS A GAP HAS
existed between the assurances auditors
provide on management-compiled finan-
cial information and the expectations of
investors and other financial statement
users.
• RECENT EFFORTS TO CLOSE the
expectation gap have focused on influ-
encing public opinion and changing pro-
fessional standards to ensure an audit is
designed to provide reasonable assur-
ance that material errors, irregularities
and misstatements in financial state-
ments will be detected.
• A SURVEY OF INVESTORS found
they held auditors to a high level of as-
surance. Almost half expected complete
or absolute assurance that material fi-
nancial statement errors would be de-
tected. Over 70% expected absolute as-
surance that material misstatement due
to fraud would be detected.
• IF INVESTORS EXPECT AND the
courts begin to uphold a standard of ab-
solute assurance, audit liability in-
evitably will increase. As a result, the
profession should devote substantial re-
sources to increasing public understand-
ing of an audit's nature and its inherent
limitations.
• WHILE A VARIETY OF MEANS
are available for bridging the expecta-
tion gap, including increased public
awareness and education, the most im-
mediate is through ailherence to current
audit standards. Auditors should be
more sensitive to the possible existence
of fraud in every audit they conduct.
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Investor perceptions of audit assurance
The auditor should do whatever investigation is necessary so he or
she can provide assurance the audited financial statements are free
from material misstatements. This assurance should be described as
follows:
No assurance necessary
Reasonable assurance
Absolute assurance
Error
1.67%
51.05
47.28
Fraud
2.51%
26.36
71.13
opposition to the levels of assurance stated
in the auditor's report and in current pro-
fessional standards.
As surprising as these results are, they
pale in comparison with the high assurance
levels sought for fraud detection. Over TO'^
of investors believe auditors should be held
to absolute assurance for detecting maten-
al misstatement due tu fraud. The profes-
sion, in SAS no. 53, formally recognizes
that frauds and intentional misrepresenta-
tions, even if material, are more difficult to
detect than misstatements due to errors.
Nevertheless, investors seemingly set
the assurance standard for detection of
fraud higher than that for detection of er-
rors—both of which exceed current profes-
sional standards. Hence, the profession's
perception that an audit should provide
reasonable assurance of financial state-
ment accuracy is held by only a minority of
investors. In sum, the majority of investors
want from an audit absolute assurance the
financial statements are fi'ee of all types of
material misstatement.
BRIDGING THE GAP
The findings unmistakably reveal an ex-
pectation gap between auditors and in-
vestors on the level of assurance an audit
provides. The evidence suggests investors
seek very high levels of financial state-
ment assurance. Auditors should not only
be interested in but also be aware of these
shareholder perceptions. The litigious en-
vironment in which CPAs operate man-
dates that we. intlividually and as a pro-
fession, monitor public opinion and atti-
tudes toward the level of services and as-
surance provided.
If investors expect, and courts begin to
uphold, a standard of absolute assurance,
audit liability inevitably will increase sub-
stantially. Thus, it is necessary from both
societal and professional perspectives that
CPAs try to narrow the expectation gap.
To do so, however, both groups need to be-
come active agents for change.
The gap may be narrowed partly
through increased public understanding of
an audit's nature and its inherent limita-
tions. The AICPA should devote substan-
tial resources to explaining to the public
the auditor's current role in the financial
reporting process and an audit's inevitable
limitations. Increased educational efforts
with clients and audit committees, at
shareholder meetings, in professional and
civic organizations and at every available
juncture should be used to communicate an
audit's merits and limitations. Our survey
found that, in general, the more educated
an investor was regarding accounting, fi-
nance and investment analysis—including
the use of the auditor's report—the less
likely he or she was to require absolute au-
ditor assurance. Hence, increased aware-
ness and education seem to be viable ways
to bridge the gap.
Accordingly, an additiitnal way of edu-
cating the public is through continued use
of the new audit report explicitly indicat-
ing reasonable assurance. Since the report
has been used for a relatively short period
of time, it may take longer for the new
messages to affect public perception suffi-
ciently. Standard setters should continu-
ously evaluate the autlit report's commu-
nicative effectiveness by testing wording
changes on investors, bankers, educators,
government and court officials to learn
how the audit repoit affects perceptions of
the assurances provided and not provided
by an audit. However, reliance on the au-
dit report alone to educate report users
will not be sufficient to have an impact on
user perceptions.
A supplemental educational medium
that may be used is the 1989 AICPA pam-
phlet. Understanding Aiuiita and the Au-
ditor's Report: A Guide for Finaiicinl
Statement Users. Unfortunately, the pam-
phlet has not attained widespread distribu-
tion and, accordingly, its educational im-
pact has been minimal. Substantially in-
creased dissemination would be advanta-
geous in presenting auditor views and pro-
viding a foundation for discussion that
eventually might lead to a nai-rowing of the
gap. Hut individual shai-t'luilders are not
likely to read this publication unsolicited.
A more direct approach to increasing
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user awareness of the audit function was
suggested by Robert Mednick. (See "The
Auditor's Role in Society: A New Ap-
proach to Solving the Perception Gap,"
JofA, Feb.86, page 70.) He proposed a
supplemental "report" to accompany the
audit report describing in plain English an
audit's usefulness, the assurances provid-
ed and the limitations. Such a report es-
sentially would summarize the informa-
tion in the AICPA pamphlet but would be
substantially condensed and much more
visible and useful to all fmancial informa-
tion users.
Since messages of this type, no matter
how positively worded, could become
tainted if promulgated by the AICPA, the
Securities and Exchange Commission
should be encouraged to develop a similar
unbiased report to be presented with reg-
istrants' fihngs and financial statements.
An SEC communication regarding the au-
dit function and the assurances provided
may be more convincing to financial state-
ment users than one emanating from audi-
tors. A SEC requirement, however, will
not be effective for smaller and nonpub-
licly traded entities.
The profession lacks an easily accessible
fraud database. Development and dissemi-
nation of a national database on perpetrat-
ed frauds and the effective and efficient
methods of detecting various frauds would
increase audit effectiveness. Since financial
statement users seek high levels of assur-
ance, fraud-detection techniques and their
appropriate use should be readily available
to all auditors. If they were, fraud audits
might become more prevalent or even rou-
tine as part of the service package offered
by auditors.
The audit risk model in SAS no. 47, Au-
dit Risk and Materiality in Conducting an
Audit, suggests overall audit risk (in terms
of the overall level of assurance provided
by an audit) can be reduced through in-
creased substantive testing. Another way
to address the gap is to offer a range of au-
dit services (including fraud audits) with
various levels of assurance. During the
shareholders' meeting, investors could be
offered an array of applicable services and
approximate costs. They then could decide
for themselves what level of assurance
they are willing to pay for each year. This
would serve not only to educate investors
to an audit's inherent limitations but also
to enlighten them to the relative costs for
increased audit work that would lead to in-
creased levels of assurance.
The most immediate means of bridging
the gap is simply through adherence to
current audit standards. The important
message behind SAS no. 53 is auditors
should be more sensitive to the possible
existence of material irregularities
(frauds) in every audit. Heightened audit
sensitivity to management honesty and in-
tegrity not only will affect overall audit
performance but also will produce audits
that provide the highest levels of assur-
ance currently possible for the detection of
all misstatements.
In the long term, to move toward bridg-
ing the expectation gap the audit profes-
sion needs to expand services and undergo
a fundamental change in attitude from self-
defense-self-preservation to meeting soci-
ety's expectations. This shift is beginning
to take place already. Such a reorientation
also means an expansion of services, in-
cluding more work to detect frauds and
more internal control audits and disclo-
sures. It also means more opportunities to
• Increase the quality and diversity of
audits.
• Increase the scope of services provid-
ed and, accordingly, firm revenues.
• Decrease liability exposure due to not
meeting existing user demands.
To close the gap more completely, how-
ever, the audit profession and financial
community need to reexamine the funda-
mental role of an audit in society and to be
sure financial statement preparers, users
and auditors all are in agreement. As long
as users and auditors continue to have dif-
ferent understandings of what "present
fairly" according to generally accepted ac-
counting principles really means, the ex-
pectation gap will remain and auditors will
continue to be faced with lawsuits.
HARP TO IMPLEMENT
Some of these suggestions may be hard to
implement. However, until substantial
changes occur the expectation gap will per-
sist and the litigation explosion will contin-
ue to plague CPAs as injured shareholders
argue accountants "should have known" a
stock's price was going to fall or a fraud
had been committed.
Investor views should serve as a re-
minder to the profession and individual au-
ditors that professional audit standards do
not dictate public opinion. Misconceptions
and differences in expectations—not to
mention the current litigious environ-
ment—will persist unless effectively and
timely addressed. •
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